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Agent du service à la clientèle avec casque d'écoute, illustrant la fraude aux cartes-cadeaux chez Staples

Staples gift card fraud: the “internal” tool was reachable from the internet

Over 15,000 gift cards, worth more than 5 million US dollars, issued through a retailer’s own tools and then spent at Target, Sephora and Lowe’s. That’s what a US search warrant application unsealed this month and analyzed by 404 Media describes. The document doesn’t name the company, but 404 Media identified it as Staples. Staples did not respond to requests for comment.

This gift card fraud case isn’t only about big chains. It started with an “internal” tool that wasn’t really internal. And many small businesses have tools like that: an admin portal, a CRM, a customer-support tool, forgotten diagnostic pages.

What happened, link by link

According to the warrant, the attackers reached Nexus from outside, a customer-support app the company believed was only accessible from its own network. Homeland Security Investigations was told in October 2023. The events date back to 2023, but they’ve only just been made public.

1

An exposed “internal” tool

Nexus, the customer-support app, was reachable from outside even though the company believed it was limited to its own network.

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2

Memory dumps

The attackers sent several “heap dump” requests, which copy what the app holds in memory.

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3

Hijacked sessions

That data held what they needed to take over sessions of support reps who were already logged in.

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4

Cards issued

Over 15,000 gift cards created and sent to email addresses the attackers controlled.

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5

Alerts bypassed

The Kount anti-fraud tool declined some orders, but many were still marked for fulfillment.

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6

In-store spending

Cards shown on a phone and scanned at the register, mostly for electronics.

One detail matters: the document explains how the attackers went from the app’s memory to employee sessions, but it doesn’t say how they got outside access in the first place. The rest of the chain is very clear.

Gift card fraud: an order that should never have gone through

Gizmodo reports an example order taken from the warrant. Read it the way a fraud rule would:

INTERNAL ORDER

example described in the search warrant

1Target gift cards2,000
Value of each card200 US dollars
2Amount charged per card0.01 US dollar
3Paymentinvalid gift card number
Actual order value400,000 US dollars
TOTAL CHARGED20 US dollars

Three signals that should have stopped the order

1Volume: 2,000 cards in a single order placed by a support rep.

2Amount: 200-US-dollar cards charged one cent each.

3Payment: an invalid gift card number, even though paying for gift cards with a gift card wasn’t allowed.

The Kount anti-fraud system did flag and decline some orders. But many were still marked for fulfillment, and payment and fraud holds were bypassed. An alert that blocks nothing and that nobody handles is just one more log entry.

Where the cards went

Staples fraud cards spent, as reported by retailers (in US dollars)

Lowe’s226,000

450 cards, online and at more than 22 stores

Targetabout 141,000

3,850 cards, 300 transactions, 85 stores, 18 states, in two days

Sephora58,600

about 330 cards, 1,500 online transactions

In total, about 4,630 cards were used, for about 425,000 US dollars: a fraction of the more than 5 million US dollars issued. Source: TechSpot, based on the warrant published by 404 Media.

At a Target in New Hampshire, 35 cards tied to the attack were used within one hour to buy Apple, Bose and Powerbeats products. The wider network behind the same scheme acquired more than 100 million US dollars in gift cards, according to the US Justice Department, which announced sentences for three Chinese nationals in April.

The lesson for a small business: are your “internal” tools really internal?

You may not sell gift cards. But your online store issues promo codes, your CRM can create credits, your billing software can cancel an invoice. Every tool that can create value deserves the same questions.

Online store admin portal

What we assume
“Only staff know the address.”
The risk
An address isn’t a password: bots try well-known paths all the time.
What to check
Access limited by IP address or VPN, MFA required, named accounts.

Customer-support tool or CRM

What we assume
“It’s just a support tool.”
The risk
It can often issue credits, refunds or gift cards: that’s money.
What to check
Per-agent limits, dual approval above a threshold, action log.

Diagnostic and debug pages

What we assume
“That was for development.”
The risk
Some Java apps (Spring Boot) expose an address like /actuator/heapdump that hands over memory, sessions included.
What to check
Disabled in production, or protected by authentication.

Employee sessions

What we assume
“They signed in with MFA.”
The risk
A stolen session can be replayed without a password or MFA.
What to check
Short sessions, re-authentication before a sensitive action.

Session hijacking isn’t unique to Staples. We saw the same principle in Microsoft 365 session token theft: a session that already passed sign-in is worth a password and MFA. And the ASOS hack already showed that customer-communication tools are a prime target.

Five checks to do this week

For every tool that can create value (credits, refunds, codes, cards):

  • ☐ Check from outside what actually responds: portals, admin pages, diagnostic addresses. Anything that doesn’t need to be public goes behind a VPN or an IP allow list.
  • ☐ Disable debug and memory-dump features in production, or protect them with authentication.
  • ☐ Require re-authentication before a sensitive action and shorten session lifetimes.
  • ☐ Set per-employee limits and dual approval above a threshold for cards, credits and refunds.
  • ☐ Make sure every fraud or security alert reaches a person who acts, not just a log.

❔ What we don’t know yet

The warrant doesn’t establish how the attackers first got outside access to Nexus, and Staples hasn’t commented. So we won’t draw conclusions about the root cause. The lesson already holds: a tool you think is internal needs to be checked from the outside.

That last check is often the weak link at small businesses: alerts exist, but nobody reads them in the evening or on weekends. Our automated 24/7 monitoring with on-call technician intervention connects the alert to the action, and our cybersecurity services start with a list of what your business actually exposes on the internet. If you host an online store, also ask your host the right security questions.

Book your free cyber check

Not sure what your tools expose on the internet, or who can issue a credit or a refund? The free cyber check reviews your portals, access and alerts, and gives you a clear priority list.

👉 Book your free cyber check

Call us at 438-476-2322 or email info@neotechcloudsolutions.com.

Sources

Photo: MART PRODUCTION, Pexels (Pexels licence).

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